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A recent "revisionist " literature characterizes the pronounced rise in U.S. wage inequality since 1980
as an "episodic " event of the first-half of the 1980s driven by non-market factors (particularly a falling
real minimum wage) and concludes that continued increases in wage inequality since the late 1980s
substantially reflect the mechanical confounding effects of changes in labor force composition. Analyzing
data from the Current Population Survey for 1963 to 2005, we find limited support for these claims.
The slowing of the growth of overall wage inequality in the 1990s hides a divergence in the paths
of upper-tail (90/50) inequality -- which has increased steadily since 1980, even adjusting for changes
in labor force composition -- and lower tail (50/10) inequality, which rose sharply in the first-half of
the 1980s and plateaued or contracted thereafter. Fluctuations in the real minimum wage are not a
plausible explanation for these trends since the bulk of inequality growth occurs above the median
of the wage distribution. Models emphasizing rapid secular growth in the relative demand for skills
-- attributable to skill-biased technical change -- and a sharp deceleration in the relative supply of college
workers in the 1980s do an excellent job of capturing the evolution of the college/high-school wage
premium over four decades. But these models also imply a puzzling deceleration in relative demand
growth for college workers in the early 1990s, also visible in a recent "polarization" of skill demands
in which employment has expanded in high-wage and low-wage work at the expense of middle-wage
jobs. These patterns are potentially reconciled by a modified version of the skill-biased technical change
hypothesis that emphasizes the role of information technology in complementing abstract (high-education)
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I.  Introduction 
A large literature documents a substantial widening of the U.S. wage structure during the 1980s (Bound 
and Johnson 1992; Katz and Murphy 1992; Murphy and Welch 1992; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 1993). 
Wage differentials by education, by occupation and by age and experience group all rose substantially.
1 
Residual wage inequality—that is, wage dispersion within demographic and skill groups—increased 
simultaneously. The growth of wage inequality was reinforced by changes in non-wage compensation 
leading to a large increase in total compensation inequality (Hamermesh, 1999; Pierce 2001). These wage 
structure changes translated into a pronounced rise in both household income inequality and consumption 
inequality, implying a marked increase in the disparities of economic well-being for U.S. families (Cutler 
and Katz 1992; Karoly and Burtless 1995). 
This literature reaches two broad conclusions. First, much of the rise in U.S. earnings inequality during 
the 1980s appears explained by shifts in the supply of and demand for skills combined with the erosion of 
labor market institutions—including labor unions and the minimum wage—that protected the earnings of 
low- and middle-wage workers.
 2 Second, a number of influential studies argue that the surge of inequality 
evident in the 1980s reflected an ongoing, secular rise in the demand for skill that commenced decades 
earlier and perhaps accelerated during the 1980s with the onset of the computer revolution. When this 
secular demand shift met with an abrupt slowdown in the growth of the relative supply of college equivalent 
workers during the 1980s—itself a consequence of slowing educational attainment for cohorts born after 
1949 and of smaller entering labor force cohorts—wage differentials expanded rapidly (Katz and Murphy 
1992; Autor, Katz and Krueger 1998; Goldin and Katz 2001; Card and Lemieux, 2001; Acemoglu 2002). 
Drawing on more recent data, however, some recent studies challenge these conclusions. Most notably, 
Card and DiNardo (2002) stake two dissenting claims. First, they argue that the rise of inequality during the 
1980s is largely explained by non-market factors, most prominently, the declining real value of the 
minimum wage, a view that was earlier articulated by Lee (1999).
3 Second, Card and DiNardo conclude 
that the growth of U.S. earnings inequality was primarily a one-time (“episodic”) event of the early 1980s, 
which plateaued by the mid 1980s and did not recur. Building on this line of argument, Lemieux (2006b)   2
concludes that the rise of residual inequality in the 1980s was also an episodic event accounted for by the 
declining value of the minimum wage and that apparent increased residual inequality since the mid 1980s 
reflects the mechanical effects of the changing labor force composition (rising education and experience).  
This “revisionist” literature has the potential to amend the description and interpretation of U.S. 
earnings inequality trends. If the rise of U.S. earnings inequality was a brief, non-recurring episode of the 
early 1980s, the probable causes are likely to be one-time precipitating events such as the 1980s decline in 
the real minimum wage. Alternatively, if the growth of earnings inequality reflects a long-term movement 
towards greater dispersion of earnings and higher skill differentials, then it is more likely to be explained by 
fundamental, secular factors, affecting the supply of and demand for skills.
4 
In this paper, we reevaluate the traditional and revisionist explanations for changes in the U.S. wage 
inequality over the last four decades, paying particular attention to two main claims of the revisionists: (1) 
that the growth of inequality was an episodic rather than secular phenomenon; and (2) that it is explained 
largely by non-market forces and the mechanical effects of labor force composition changes. We explore 
these issues using wage and employment data from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS) covering 
1963 to 2005, the May CPS samples for 1973 to 1978 combined with the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group 
(ORG) files for 1979 to 2005, and decennial population Census samples for 1980, 1990 and 2000.  
In partial support of the revisionist literature, we find that past is not prologue: overall wage inequality 
continued growing from 1990 to 2005 but at a slower pace than in the 1980s, and the secular demand 
increases favoring more educated workers were, by our estimates, less rapid in the 1990s and early 2000s 
than from the 1960s to the 1980s—though we document a rapid ongoing rise of the relative earnings of 
workers with post-college education (those with graduate and professional degrees). We concur that the 
falling minimum wage was a contributor to rising lower-tail (50-10 wage gap) wage inequality in the 1980s.  
By contrast, we find little support for strong forms of the major revisionist claims. The growth of wage 
inequality is not accurately described as an episodic event. Inequality in the upper half of the male wage 
distribution (the 90-50 wage gap) grew rapidly and nearly-continuously from 1980 to 2005 at the rate of 
about 1 log point per year—a marked, secular phenomenon.
5 The rapid secular growth of upper-tail wage   3
inequality is apparent even after adjusting for labor force compositional changes. By contrast, inequality in 
the lower-half of the distribution expanded rapidly in first-half of the 1980s and then reversed course 
thereafter. The persistent rise in upper-tail inequality belies the claim that minimum wages can provide a 
coherent explanation for the bulk of the rise in earnings inequality.  
We find some support for the revisionists’ conclusions concerning residual inequality trends. Consistent 
with Lemieux (2006b), we confirm that changes in labor force composition exerted an upward force on 
residual wage dispersion for 1989 to 2005. But this compositional effect was concentrated in the lower-tail 
of the earnings distribution and, moreover, served to offset a rapid compression of lower-tail prices. We 
find that ‘price’ changes, changes in earnings dispersion within narrowly defined demographic groups, 
remain a key force in the evolution of both upper- and lower-tail U.S. residual wage inequality. 
An organizing theme that emerges from our review of the key facts is that, following monotone a surge 
of inequality during 1979 through 1987 in which upper incomes rose and lower incomes fell, changes in the 
U.S. earnings distribution subsequently ‘polarized,’ with a strong, persistent rise in inequality in the upper 
half of the distribution and a slowing (or reversal) of inequality trends in the lower-half of the distribution. 
This polarization is seen in overall inequality, in residual inequality, and in earnings trends among workers 
at different education levels. The earnings of workers with a post-college (graduate) degree relative to non-
college workers have increased rapidly and continuously since 1979. By contrast, the earnings of college-
only workers (those with a four-year college degree but without a graduate degree) relative to high school 
graduates rose rapidly from 1979 to 1987 and then plateaued.
6  
If these inequality trends are not primarily explained by episodic institutional shocks, can they plausibly 
be explained by market-driven changes in the supply and demand for skills? In the final section, we provide 
a simple summary test of this hypothesis using Census data to analyze the evolution of employment and 
wage changes by skill over the 1980 to 2000 period. These data yield clear evidence that wages changes by 
earnings level and employment changes by skill level track each other closely in both decades. In the 1980s, 
during which wage growth was essentially monotone in skill, employment shares in the highest educated 
and highest paid occupations expanded substantially while employment shares in the lowest skill   4
occupations contracted. During the subsequent decade of the 1990s—in which earnings growth polarized—
employment shares in very low and very high skill occupations increased while employment shares in 
moderately skilled occupations contracted. The roughly parallel movement of earnings and employment 
growth in each decade suggests that demand forces have played a key role in shaping wages structure 
changes during the inequality surge of the 1980s and the polarization that followed. Following Autor, Levy 
and Murnane (2003) and Goos and Manning (2007), we find that these patterns may in part be explained by 
a richer version of the skill-biased technical change hypothesis in which information technology 
complements highly educated workers engaged in abstract tasks, substitutes for moderately educated 
workers performing routine tasks, and has less impact on low-skilled workers performing manual tasks. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II documents the evolution of the U.S. wage structure from 
1963 to 2005. Section III presents time series models to assess the role of demand, supply, and institutional 
factors for changes in educational wage differentials and overall wage inequality. Section IV uses the kernel 
reweighting methods of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and Lemieux (2006b) to analyze the role of 
prices and labor force composition in changes in overall and residual inequality—focusing on the divergent 
trends in the bottom and top halves of the distribution. Section VI provides summary tests of the relevance 
of demand shifts to wage structure changes. Section VI concludes. 
II.  U.S. wage structure changes over the past four decades: Key facts 
To summarize the basic changes in the U.S. wage structure over the last four decades using, we draw on 
two large and representative household data sources: the March CPS and the combined CPS May and 
Outgoing Rotation Group samples. We describe these sources briefly here and provide the details on the 
construction of our analysis samples in the Data Appendix. The March CPS data provide reasonably 
comparable data on prior year’s annual earnings, weeks worked, and hours worked per week for four 
decades. We use the March files from 1964 to 2006 (covering earnings from 1963 to 2005) to form a 
sample of real weekly earnings for workers ages 16 to 64 who participate in the labor force on a full-time, 
full-year (FTFY) basis, defined as working 35-plus hours per week and 40-plus weeks per year.
7  
We complement the March FTFY series data with data on hourly wages of all current labor force   5
participants using May CPS samples for 1973 through 1978 and CPS Outgoing Rotation Group samples for 
1979 through 2003 (CPS May/ORG). From these sources, we construct hourly wage data for all wage and 
salary workers employed during the CPS sample survey reference week. Unlike the retrospective annual 
earnings data in the March CPS, the May/ORG data provide point-in-time measures of usual hourly or 
weekly earnings. We weight May/ORG hourly earnings data by hours worked and the appropriate CPS 
sampling weight to provide a measure of the entire distribution of hours paid.  
As detailed in Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005) and Lemieux (2006b), both the March and May/ORG 
CPS surveys have limitations that reduce their consistency over the forty year period studied. The March 
CPS data are not ideal for analyzing the hourly wage distribution since they lack a point-in-time wage 
measure and thereby hourly wages must be computed by dividing annual earnings by the product of weeks 
worked last year and usual weekly hours last year. Estimates of hours worked last year from the March CPS 
appear to be noisy and data on usual weekly hours last year are not available prior to the 1976 March CPS. 
The May/ORG samples provide more accurate measures of the hourly wage distribution (particularly for 
hourly workers) but cover a shorter time period than the March CPS. Both the March and May/ORG CPS 
samples have undergone various changes in processing procedures over several decades, especially 
involving the top-coding of high earnings, the flagging of earning imputations, and algorithms used for 
allocating earnings to those individuals who do not answer earnings questions in the survey. These create 
challenges in producing consistent data series over time, which we have tried to account for to the extent 
possible to make the wage series time consistent. The major redesign of the earnings questions in the CPS 
ORG in 1994 is likely to have created comparability problems that we are unable to fully redress.
8 
A.  Trends in overall inequality 
We begin laying out basic wage structure facts in Figure 1, which uses data on FTFY workers from the 
March CPS to illustrate the widening of U.S. wage inequality for both men and women over the past four 
decades. This figure plots the change in log real weekly wages by percentile for men and for women from 
1963 to 2005.
9 The figure displays a sizable expansion of wage inequality with the 90P
th
P percentile earners 
rising by approximately 45 log points (more than 55 percent) relative to 10P
th
P percentile earners for both men   6
and women. The figure also indicates a monotone (and almost linear) spreading out of the entire wage 
distribution for women and for the wage distribution above around the 30P
th
P percentile for men. Notably, 
women have substantially gained on men throughout the wage distribution over last four decades. 
We focus on four inequality concepts: changes in overall wage inequality, summarized by the 90-10 log 
wage differential; changes in inequality in the upper and lower halves of the wage distribution, summarized 
by 90-50 and 50-10 log wage gaps (which we refer to as upper- and lower-tail inequality); between-group 
wage differentials, illustrated using the college-high school wage premium; and within-group (residual) 
wage inequality, summarized by the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 residual wage gaps conditioning on measures 
of education, age/experience, and gender.
10  
Figures 2a and 2b display the evolution of the 90-10 overall and residual wage gaps for males and the 
college-high school log wage premium for our two core samples: March FTFY 1963 to 2005 and CPS 
May/ORG hourly 1973 to 2005. The estimated college-high school log wage premium represents a fixed 
weighted average of the college plus/high school wage gaps separately estimated for males and for females 
in four different experience groups. The figure underscores a key, and oft-neglected, fact about the 
evolution of U.S. wage inequality, which is that the rise of inequality is not a unitary phenomenon. While 
all three inequality measures expand in tandem during the 1980s then flatten somewhat in the 1990s, the 
series diverged in both the 1970s and the 1960s. Specifically, while overall and residual inequality were 
either modestly rising (March) or flat (May/ORG) during the 1970s, the college wage premium declined 
sharply in this decade and then rebounded even more rapidly during the 1980s. The college wage premium 
expanded considerably during the 1960s, even while aggregate inequality was quiescent. These divergent 
patterns suggest that the growth of inequality is unlikely to be adequately explained by any single factor. 
Underlying the rapid growth of overall wage inequality during the 1980s followed by a deceleration in the 
1990s is a divergence in inequality trends at the top and bottom of the wage distribution. This divergence is 
shown in Figure 3, which compares the evolution of the 90-50 and 50-10 log hourly and full-time weekly 
wage gaps for males and females. Upper-tail and lower-tail wage inequality expanded rapidly in the first 
half of the 1980s for both men and women. But the 50-10 wage gap for the most part stopped growing after   7
1987—and the male hourly wage series from the CPS May/ORG shows an actual decline in the 50-10 since 
the late 1980s. By contrast, the 90-50 wage gap continues to grow smoothly from 1979 to 2005. Thus, the 
deceleration of overall inequality growth since 1987 actually reflects an abrupt halt or reversal in lower-tail 
inequality expansion paired with a secular rise in upper-tail inequality.
11  
The divergent growth of upper- and lower-tail wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s is corroborated 
by micro data on wages and total compensation from the establishment-based Employment Cost Index 
(Pierce 2001). And the steady growth of upper tier earnings inequality is seen in rising shares of wages paid 
to the top 10 and top 1 percent of U.S. earners since the late 1970s in tax data (Piketty and Saez 2003).  
To summarize, the sharp growth in wage dispersion in the lower-half of the wage distribution during 
the early to mid 1980s seems to have been an episodic event that has not re-occurred over the past fifteen 
years. By contrast, the steady growth of wage dispersion in the upper half of the wage distribution appears 
to represent a secular trend that has been ongoing for 25 years.  
B.  Trends in wage levels and between group inequality 
Table 1 summarizes between-group wage structure changes by sub-period from 1963 to 2005 for 
groups defined by sex, education, and potential experience. Mean (predicted) log real weekly wages were 
computed in each year for 40 sex-education-experience groups and mean wages for broader groups are 
fixed-weighted averages of the relevant sub-group means, using the average share of total hours worked for 
each group over 1963 to 2005 as weights to adjust for compositional changes.
12  
The first row indicates that composition-adjusted mean real wage increased by 22.2 log points over the 
full period. Wage growth was rapid in the 1960s, stagnant or declining from 1971 to 1995, and rapid from 
1995 to 2005. The next two rows show that women gained substantially on males—by 16.5 log points over 
the full sample—with women's relative earnings gains concentrated in the 1979 to 1995 period.  
The following six rows highlight the expansion of educational wage differentials, with particularly large 
increases in the relative earnings of college graduates. The sharp differences across decades seen in Figure 2 
are evident in these detailed figures, with educational wage differentials rising in the 1960s, narrowing in 
the 1970s, increasing sharply in the 1980s, and growing at a slightly less torrid pace since 1995. The bottom   8
part of the table contrasts changes in real wages for younger and older males. Experience differentials 
expanded for college and high school graduates with the rise for college graduates concentrated in the 
1960s and 1970s and the rise for high school graduates concentrated in the 1980s.  
The expansion of between-group wage differentials has been less continuous—and undergone more 
reversals—than has the trend towards increasing overall wage inequality over the last four decades. 
III.  The sources of rising inequality: Proximate causes 
We now present an analysis of the leading proximate causes of overall and between-group wage 
inequality, focusing on supply and demand factors, unemployment and the minimum wage. We start with 
simple time-series models of the U.S. college wage premium covering 1963 to 2005 and augment the 
specification to allow for an impact of a key labor market institutional factor, the federal minimum wage.
13  
A.  Sources of the rising college/high-school wage premium 
Our illustrative conceptual framework starts with a CES production function for aggregate output Q  
with two factors, college equivalents (c ) and high school equivalents (h ): 
(1) 
1/ [( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ] tt t c t t t h t Qa N b N
ρ ρρ αα =+ −  
where  ct N  and  ht N  are the quantities employed of college equivalents (skilled labor) and high-school 
equivalents (unskilled labor) in period t ,  t a  and  t b  represent skilled and unskilled labor augmenting 
technological change,  t α  is a time-varying technology parameter that can be interpreted as indexing the 
share of work activities allocated to skilled labor, and ρ  is a time invariant production parameter. Skill-
neutral technological improvements raise  t a  and  t b  by the same proportion. Skill-biased technological 
changes involve increases in  / tt ab  or  t α . The aggregate elasticity of substitution between college and high-
school equivalents is given by  1/(1 ) σ ρ =− . 
Under the assumption that college and high-school equivalents are paid their marginal products, we can 
use equation (1) to solve for the ratio of marginal products of the two labor types yielding a relationship 
between relative wages in year t ,  / ct ht ww , and relative supplies in year t ,  / ct ht N N  given by   9
(2)  ln( / ) ln[ /(1 )] ln( / )] (1/ )ln( / ), ct ht t t t t ct ht ww a b NN α αρ σ =− + −  
which can be rewritten as 
(3)  ln( / ) (1/ )[ ln( / )] ct ht t ct ht ww D NN σ =− ,  
where  t D  indexes relative demand shifts favoring college equivalents and is measured in log quantity units. 
The impact of changes in relative skill supplies on relative wages depends inversely on the magnitude of 
aggregate elasticity of substitution between the two skill groups. The greater is σ , the smaller the impact of 
shifts in relative supplies on relative wages and the greater must be fluctuations in demand shifts ( t D ) to 
explain any given time series of relative wages for a given time series of relative quantities. Changes in  t D  
can arise from (disembodied) skill-biased technological change, non-neutral changes in the relative prices 
or quantities of non-labor inputs, and shifts in product demand. 
Following the approach of Katz and Murphy (1992), we directly estimate a version of equation (3) to 
explain the evolution from 1963 to 2005 of the overall log college/high school wage differential series for 
FTFY workers from the March CPS shown in Panel A of Figure 2. We substitute for the unobserved 
demand shifts  t D B with simple time trends and a measure of labor market cyclical conditions, the 
unemployment rate of males aged 25-54 years. We also include an index of the log relative supply of 
college/high school equivalents.
14 Our full model includes the log real minimum wage as a control variable: 
(4)  01 2 3 4 ln( / ) ln( / ) (RealMinWage ) Unemp ct ht ct ht t t t ww t NN γ γγ γ γ ε =++ + + + ,  
where γ2 provides an estimate of 1/σ . 
The large increase in the college wage premium over the last 40 years coincided with a substantial 
secular rise in the relative supply of college workers. The college graduate share of the full-time equivalent 
workforce increased from about 10.6 percent in 1960 to over 30 percent in 2005. Given this rapid growth in 
college graduate supply, a market-clearing model requires (even more) rapid growth in relative demand for 
college workers to reconcile increasing college supply with a rising college wage premium.  
The upper panel of Figure 4 plots the college relative supply and wage premium series over 1963 to 
2005 deviated from a linear time trend. This figure reveals an acceleration of the growth in the relative   10
supply of college workers in the 1970s relative to the 1960s, followed by a dramatic slowdown starting in 
1982. These fluctuations in the growth rate of relative supply, paired with a constant trend growth in 
relative college demand, do an effective job of explaining the evolution of the college wage premium from 
1963 to 2005. The figure illustrates that deviations in relative supply growth from a linear trend roughly fit 
the broad changes in the de-trended college wage premium. 
Table 2 presents representative regression models for the overall college/high school log wage gap 
following this approach. The first column uses the specification of Katz and Murphy (1992) for the 1963 to 
1987 period (the period analyzed by Katz-Murphy) with only a linear time trend and the relative supply 
measure included as explanatory variables. Although our data processing methods differ somewhat from 
those of Katz and Murphy, we uncover quite similar results with an estimate of  2 0.64 γ = (implying 
1.57 σ = ) and with estimated trend growth in the college wage premium of 2.6 percent per annum. The 
lower panel of Figure 4 uses this replication of the basic Katz-Murphy model from col. (1) of Table 2 to 
predict the evolution of the college wage premium for the full sample period of 1963 to 2005 and compares 
the predicted and actual college wage gap measures.  
The Katz-Murphy model does an excellent job of forecasting the growth of the college wage premium 
through 1992 (with the exception of the late 1970s) but the continued slow growth of relative supply after 
1992 leads it to over-predict the growth in the college wage premium over the last decade. This pattern 
implies there has been a slowdown in relative demand growth for college workers since 1992, as illustrated 
by a comparison of the models in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 without and with allowing for a trend 
break in 1992.
15 The model in column (3) covering the full 1963-2005 period indicates a significant 
slowdown of demand growth after 1992 but still indicates a large impact of relative supply growth with an 
estimated aggregate elasticity of substitution of 1.62 (1/0.619).
16 Subsequent models in columns (4) through 
(6) that allow for a more flexible time trend—either a quadratic or cubic function—imply that trend demand 
growth for college relative to non-college workers slowed in the early 1990s 
The implied slowdown in trend demand growth in the 1990s is potentially inconsistent with a naïve   11
SBTC story looking at the growth of computer investments since these continued rapidly in the 1990s. One 
potential explanation for this implied slowdown is the strong cyclical labor market of the expansion of the 
1990s, leading to a low unemployment rate. The impacts of labor market institutions such as the erosion of 
the real value of the minimum wage since the early 1980s might also play a role.  
The roles of cyclical conditions and the minimum wage are examined in the augmented models 
illustrated in columns (6) and (7) of Table 2. The real minimum wage and prime age male unemployment 
rates have modest additional explanatory power in the expected directions and reduce the extent of 
slowdown in trend demand growth over the last decade. But the inclusion of these variables does not much 
alter the central role for relative supply growth fluctuations and trend demand growth in explaining the 
evolution of the college wage premium. A model without the relative supply variable in column (7) leads to 
larger impacts of the real minimum wage but it also has less explanatory power and generates a puzzling 
negative impact of prime age male unemployment. These cyclical and institutional factors are insufficient to 
resolve the puzzle posed by slowing trend relative demand for college workers in the 1990s. 
A closer look at the data suggests why the simple CES model with two factors—college and high-
school equivalents—fails to provide an adequate explanation of the evolution of between-group wage 
inequality starting in the early 1990s. As shown in Figure 5, the real, composition-adjusted earnings of full-
time, full-year workers at different levels of educational attainment ‘polarized’ after 1987 in a manner 
consistent with the divergent trends in 90-50 and 50-10 inequality documented in Figure 3. In particular, the 
wage gap between males with a post-college education and those with a high school education rose rapidly 
and monotonically from 1979 through 2005, increasing by 43.1 log points overall and 15.4, 15.7 and 12.0 
points respectively between 1979–1988, 1988–1997, and 1997–2005.
17 By contrast, after increasing by 13.3 
log points between 1979 and 1987, the wage gap between males with exactly a college degree and those 
with a high school education rose comparatively slowly thereafter, by 4.5 and 9.0 log points respectively 
between 1988–1997 and 1997–2005. By implication, between 1988 and 2005, the earnings of post-college 
males rose by 14.2 log points more than the earnings of college-only males. Conversely, at the bottom of 
the wage distribution, the wage gap between high school graduates and high school dropouts increased   12
steadily from 1979 and 1997, then flattened or reversed. 
This pattern, in which wage gaps within college-educated and non-college-educated workers groups 
diverge, is inconsistent with the basic, two-factor CES model. In this model, the labor input of all college-
educated worker subgroups is assumed to be perfectly substitutable up to a scalar multiple, and similarly for 
non-college worker subgroups. Accordingly, the wage ratio of college-educated to post-college educated 
worker should be roughly constant, as should the wage ratio of high school dropouts to high school 
graduates. This two-factor assumption fits the data rather well from 1963 to 1987. However, the drastic rise 
in earnings of post-secondary relative to college-only workers after 1987 and the slightly increasing 
earnings of dropouts relative to high school graduates after 1997, represent significant departures from the 
assumptions of the model. Fundamentally, the two-factor model does not accommodate a setting in which 
the wages of very-high and very low-skilled workers rise relative to those of middle-educated workers—
that is, a setting where wage growth polarizes. We consider the sources of this polarization in Section V.  
B.  The college/high-school gap by experience group 
As shown in Table 1, changes in the college/high school wage gap differed substantially by 
age/experience groups over recent decades, with the rise in the college/high-school gap concentrated among 
less experienced workers in the 1980s. We illustrate this pattern in Figure 6 through a comparison of the 
evolution of the college premium (panel A) and college relative supply (panel B) for younger workers 
(those with 0-9 years of potential experience) and older workers (those with 20-29 years of potential 
experience). The return to college for younger workers has increased much more substantially since 1980 
than for older workers. To the extent that workers with similar education but different ages or experience 
levels are imperfect substitutes in production, one should expect age-group or cohort-specific relative skill 
supplies—as well as aggregate relative skill supplies—to affect the evolution of the college-high school by 
age or experience as emphasized in a careful analysis by Card and Lemieux (2001). Consistent with this 
view, the lower panel of Figure 6 shows a much more rapid deceleration in relative college supply among 
younger than older workers in the mid to late 1970s. 
In Table 3, we take fuller account of these differing trends by estimating regression models for the   13
college wage by experience group that extend the basic specification in equation (4) to include own 
experience group relative skill supplies. The first two columns of Table 3 present regressions pooled across 
4 potential experience groups (those with 0-9, 10-19, 20-29, and 30-39 years of experience) allowing for 
group-specific intercepts but constraining the other coefficients to be the same for all experience groups. 
These models estimate: 
(5)  01 2 3 ln( / ) [ln( / ) ln( / )] ln( / ) cjt hjt cjt hjt ct ht ct ht t j jt ww NN NN NN X β ββ β δ η =+ − + + ++,  
where  j  indexes experience group, the  j δ  are experience group main effects,  and  t X  includes measures 
of time trends and other demand shifters. This specification arises from an aggregate CES production 
function in college and high school equivalents of the form of equation (1) where these aggregate inputs are 
themselves CES sub-aggregates of college and high school labor by experience group (Card and Lemieux 
2001). Under these assumptions,  2 1/β −  provides an estimate of σ  the aggregate elasticity of substitution 
and  1 1/β −  provides an estimate of  E σ ,
 the partial elasticity of substitution between different experience 
groups within the same education group. 
The estimates in the first two columns of Table 3 indicate substantial effects of both own-group and 
aggregate supplies on the evolution the college wage premium by experience group. While the implied 
estimates of the aggregate elasticity of substitution in the Table 3 models are very similar to the aggregate 
models in Table 2, the implied value of the partial elasticity of substitution between experience groups is 
around 3.55 (somewhat lower than the estimates in Card and Lemieux 2001). These estimates indicate that 
differences in own-group relative college supply growth go a substantial distance towards explaining 
variation across experience groups in the evolution of the college wage premium in recent decades. For 
example, as seen in Figure 6, from 1980 to 2005 the college wage premium increased by 29.9 log points for 
the 0-9 year experience group and by 23.0 log points for the 20-29 year experience group. Over the same 
period the own group relative college supply for the 0-9 year experience group grew by 26.7 log points less 
rapidly than for the 20-29 year experience group. Thus, using the implied own-group relative inverse 
substitution elasticity of -0.282 in column (1) of Table 3, we find that the slower relative supply growth for   14
the younger (0-9 year) experience group explains the entirety (7.53 log points of a 6.90 log point gap) of the 
larger increase in the college premium for the younger than for the older (20-29 year) experience group.         
The final four columns of Table 3 present regression models of the college wage premium separately 
estimated by experience group. Trend demand changes and relative skill supplies play a large role in 
changes in educational differentials for younger and prime age workers. The college wage premium for 
younger workers appears more sensitive to own group and aggregate relative skill supplies than the 
premium for older workers. The real minimum wage is a significant determinant of changes in the college 
wage premium for younger workers, but, plausibly, does not appear important for older workers.  
In summary, a simple supply-demand framework emphasizing a secular increase in the relative demand 
for college workers combined with fluctuations in relative skill supplies can account for some of the key 
patterns in the recent evolution of between-group inequality, including the contraction and expansion of the 
college-high school gap during the 1970s and 1980s and the differential rise in the college/high-school gap 
by experience group in the 1980s and 1990s.
18   
What drives these secular demand shifts? A large literature reviewed in Katz and Autor (1999) and Katz 
(2000) yields two consistent findings suggesting that skill-biased technological change has played an 
integral role.
19 The first is that the relative employment of more-educated workers and non-production 
workers has increased rapidly within detailed industries and within establishments in the United States 
during the 1980s and 1990s, despite the sharp rise in the relative wages of these groups (Dunne, 
Haltiwanger, and Troske 1997; Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998). Similar patterns of within-industry 
increases in the proportion of skilled workers are apparent in other advanced nations (Berman, Bound, and 
Machin 1998; Machin and Van Reenen 1998). These findings suggest strong within-industry demand shifts 
favoring the more skilled.
20 Second, a wealth of quantitative and case-study evidence documents a striking 
correlation between the adoption of computer-based technologies (and associated organizational 
innovations) and the increased use of college-educated labor within detailed industries, within firms, and 
across plants within industries (Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2002; Levy and 
Murnane 2004; Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw 2007).    15
C.  The role of the minimum wage 
Several studies, including Lee (1999), Card and DiNardo (2002) and Lemieux (2006b), conclude the 
minimum wage plays a primary role in the rise of wage inequality since 1980. Yet, our simple models 
above do not find the minimum wage to be important in the evolution of educational wage differentials, 
except possibly for young workers. Why do our conclusions differ? The discrepancy partially arises from a 
disjuncture between trends in between-group inequality (the college/high-school gap) and trends in overall 
and residual inequality. As seen in Figure 2, overall inequality was flat during the 1970s while between-
group inequality fell; conversely, as between group-inequality continued to rise in the 1990s, residual 
inequality stabilized. Between-group and residual inequality move closely together only during 1979-87. 
 Following our simple models for the college/high-school earnings gap above, we provide a time-series 
analysis for the proximate sources of the growth of overall, upper-tail, and lower-tail hourly wage 
inequality. As emphasized by Card and DiNardo (2002), there is a striking time series relationship between 
the real value of the federal minimum wage and hourly wage inequality, as measured by the 90-10 log 
earnings ratio. This relationship is depicted in Figure 7. A simple regression of the 90-10 log hourly wage 
gap from the May/ORG CPS for the years 1973 to 2005 on the real minimum wage yields a coefficient of -
0.74 and an R-squared of 0.71. Based in part on this tight correspondence, Card and DiNardo (2002) and 
Lemieux (2006b) argue that much of the rise in overall and residual inequality over the last two decades 
may be attributed to the minimum wage.
21 In a cross state analysis of the minimum wage and wage 
inequality for the period 1979 to 1991, Lee (1999) reaches a similar conclusion.  
A potential problem for this argument is that the majority of the rise in earnings inequality over the last 
two decades occurred in the upper half of the earnings distribution. Since it is not plausible that a declining 
minimum wage could cause large increases in upper-tail earnings inequality, this observation suggests that 
the minimum wage is unlikely to provide a satisfying explanation for the bulk of inequality growth. Not 
surprisingly, as shown in the upper panel of Figure 7, the real minimum wage is highly correlated with 
lower-tail earnings inequality between 1973 and 2005; a 1 log point rise in the minimum is associated with 
0.26 log point compression in lower-tail inequality. Somewhat surprisingly, the minimum wage is also   16
highly correlated with upper-tail inequality: a 1 log point rise in the minimum is associated with a 0.48 log 
point compression in upper-tail inequality (Figure 7, lower panel).  
These bivariate relationships may potentially mask other confounds. To explore these relationships in 
slightly greater detail, we estimated a set of descriptive regressions for 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 hourly 
earnings inequality over 1973 to 2005. In addition to the minimum wage measure used in Figures 7, we 
augmented these models with a linear time trend, a measure of college/high-school relative supply 
(calculated from the May/ORG CPS), the male prime-age unemployment rate (as a measure of labor market 
tightness), and in some specifications a post-1992 time trend, reflecting the estimated trend reduction in 
skill demand in the 1990s. The main finding from these models is that the strong relationship between the 
minimum wage and both upper and lower-tail inequality is highly robust. In a specification that includes a 
linear time trend, the college/high school supply measure, and the prime-age unemployment rate variable, 
the minimum wage measure has a coefficient of -0.23 for lower-tail inequality and a coefficient of -0.10 for 
upper-tail inequality (both significant).  
These patterns suggest that the time series correlation between minimum wages and inequality is 
unlikely to provide causal estimates of minimum wage impacts. Indeed, the relationship between the 
minimum wage and upper-tail inequality is potential evidence of spurious causation. Although the decline 
in the real minimum wage during the 1980s likely contributed to the expansion of lower-tail inequality—
particularly for women—the robust correlation of the minimum wage with upper-tail inequality suggests 
other factors are at work.
22  One possibility is that federal minimum wage changes (or inaction) during these 
decades were partially a response to political pressures associated with changing labor market conditions 
and costs to employers of a minimum wage increase. This political economy story could help explain the 
coincidence of falling minimum wages and rising upper-tail inequality.
23   
IV.  Rising residual inequality: The role of composition and prices 
 
The educational attainment and labor market experience of the U.S. labor force rose substantially over 
the last 30 years as the large 1970s entering (“baby boom”) college cohorts reached mid-career during the 
1990s. The full-time equivalent employment share of male workers with a college degree rose from less   17
than one-fifth to approximately one-third of the U.S. male labor force from 1973 to 2005. The mean 
potential experience of male workers with high school or greater education also increased substantially (by 
2 to 5 years) from 1973 to 2005 with the largest gains for college workers.  
As discussed by Lemieux (2006b), these shifts in labor force composition may have played a role in 
changes in measured wage inequality. The canonical Mincer (1974) earnings model implies that earnings 
trajectories fan out as workers gain labor market experience. Hourly wage dispersion is also typically higher 
for college graduates than for less-educated workers. Thus, changes in the distribution of education or 
experience of the labor force can lead to changes in wage dispersion. These compositional effects are 
distinct from the standard price effects arising from shifts in supply-demand and institutional factors. 
Holding market prices constant, changes in labor force composition can mechanically raise or lower 
residual earnings dispersion simply by altering the employment share of worker groups that have more or 
less dispersed earnings. Similarly, changes in workforce composition can also raise or lower overall 
earnings dispersion by increasing or reducing heterogeneity in observed skills (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 
1993). These observations suggest that measured earnings dispersion may change due to the mechanical 
impact of composition without any underlying change in market prices.  
Following such an approach, Lemieux (2006b) finds that most of the growth in residual wage 
dispersion from 1973 to 2003—and all of the growth after 1988—is explained by mechanical effects of 
changes in workforce composition rather than shifts in residual inequality within defined skill groups (what 
we call ‘price’ effects). Lemieux concludes that the rise in residual earnings inequality is mainly attributable 
to institutional factors during the 1980s—especially the falling real minimum wage—and to mechanical 
labor force composition effects since the late 1980s. 
We reassess these conclusions, adhering closely to the methods and data sources used by Lemieux 
(2006b). Our analysis differs from Lemieux in one key respect: whereas Lemieux focuses primarily on the 
contribution of prices and composition to the variance of wage residuals—thus aggregating over changes in 
the upper and lower tails of the distribution—we  focus on the contribution of prices and composition to 
changes in upper and lower-tail earnings inequality (both overall and residual). We conclude that changes in   18
labor force composition do not substantially contribute to an explanation for the diverging path of upper and 
lower tail inequality, either overall or residual, over the past three decades.  
A.  Implementation  
We employ a variant of the kernel reweighting approach introduced by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 
(1996, DFL hereafter).
24 We write the observed density of wages at times t  and t′ as  
(6)  (| ) (|, ) (| ) f w Tt g w x Tt h x Tt d x == = = ∫  and  ( | ) ( | , ) ( | ) f wT t gwxT thxT td x ′ ′′ == = = ∫ . 
In this expression, w is the logarithm of the hourly wage, T  is a variable denoting the year from which an 
observation is drawn,  ( | , ) g wx T t =  is the density of wages for observable attributes  x at survey year t , 
and ( | ) hxT t =  is the density of attributes  x at survey year t . Equation (6) decomposes the density of 
wages into two functions: a ‘price’ function,  ( ) g i  that provides the conditional distribution of wages for 
given attributes and time, and a ‘composition’ function,  ( ) h i , that provides the density of attributes in that 
time period.  
Using this decomposition, we can develop counterfactual wage densities by combining the price 
function  () t g i  from some period t  with the composition function,  () t h′ i  from an alternative period t′. As 
shown by DFL, calculating such a counterfactual simply requires reweighting the price function  ( ) t g i  in 
year t by the ratio of the density of attributes x  in year t′ to the density of attributes in year t,  ()/ () tt hh ′ ii . 
Applying Bayes rule, this reweighting function can be written as:  
(7) 
( | ) Pr( | ) 1 Pr( )
(| ) 1P r ( |) P r ( )
hxT t T t x T t
hxT t T t x T t
′′ ′ == − =
=×
′′ =− = =
. 
The reweighting function can be estimated using a logit model applied to the pooled data sources,  () hx, 
from years t and t′.  
The validity of this counterfactual exercise rests on the partial equilibrium assumption that prices and 
quantities can be viewed as independent—that is, changes in labor market quantities,  ( ) hx, do not affect 
labor market prices,  ( ) g x . Although analytically convenient, this assumption is economically unappealing,   19
and, moreover, is precisely opposite in spirit to our supply-demand analysis in Section III. Given the 
dramatic changes in the education and experience of the labor market over the three decades and their 
attendant affects on labor market prices documented above, the partial equilibrium assumptions underlying 
this exercise are certain to be violated. Nevertheless, we view this analysis as worthwhile because it permits 
a direct assessment of the substantive conclusions of Lemieux (2006b), taking the methodology as given.
25  
To evaluate the importance of shifts in composition and prices to observed changes in overall and 
residual wage inequality, we draw on our core May/ORG hourly wage samples from 1973 to 2005 to 
construct counterfactual wage distributions. In each sample year t , we apply the labor force composition 
data,  () t hx, to the price function,  (|, ) gwxT t ′ =  from the years 1973, 1989 and 2005. This procedure 
simulates (via reweighting) a hypothetical set of cases where labor force composition is allowed to evolve 
as actually occurred over 1973 to 2005 while labor market prices are held at their start-of-period (1973), 
mid-period (1989) or end-of-period levels (2005). In calculating the reweighting function (equation (7)), we 
employ the same covariates in the  x  vector as used by Lemieux (2006b). These include a full set of age 
dummies, dummies for nine discreet schooling categories,
 and a full set of interactions among the schooling 
dummies and a quartic in age. All models are estimated separately by gender. 
The procedure outlined above is suitable for obtaining counterfactuals for overall inequality. To 
calculate analogous counterfactuals for residual inequality, we replace  ( | , ) g wx T t =   in equation (6) with a 
‘residual pricing’ function,  (|, ) gx T t ε = , which is obtained by regressing the logarithm of hourly wages in 
each year on the full set of covariates in  x , then replacing the wage observations in  ( | , ) g wx T t =  with 
their corresponding residuals from the OLS regression. This residual price function provides the conditional 
distribution of wage residuals in year t  and can be used analogously to  ( | , ) g wx T t =  for calculating 
counterfactual residual densities.  
B.  Rising inequality: The role of composition and prices 
Trends in observed and counterfactual overall and residual inequality are summarized in Table 4, and 
plotted in Figures 8 and 9. In these figures, differences in the vertical height of each series within a given   20
year reflect the effect of prices on overall earnings inequality, holding labor force composition at the 
appointed year’s level. The over-time change in the level of each series moving along the x-axis reflects the 
effect of changes in labor force composition, holding prices at their 1973, 1989 or 2005 levels. 
For comparison with Lemieux (2006b), we begin by discussing residual inequality. Panel A of Table 4 
shows that male 90/50 (upper-tail) residual wage inequality rose during both halves of the sample: by 4.4 
log points from 1973 to 1989 and by 4.0 log points from 1989 to 2005. Holding labor force composition 
constant at its 1973, 1989 or 2005 levels does not change the basic message. In all cases, the composition-
constant rise in residual 90/50 inequality is at least 65 percent as large as the unadjusted change. This 
finding is readily seen in the upper-left panel of Figure 8, which plots actual and counterfactual male 90/50 
residual inequality over 1973 to 2005. A comparison of the heights of the 1973, 1989 and 2005 series (that 
is, pairing the 1973, 1989 and 2005 prices with the observed labor force composition in each year) 
demonstrates that composition-constant male 90/50 residual wage inequality rose substantially, both 
between 1973 and 1989 and between 1989 and 2005. As is visible from the shallow upward slopes of each 
counterfactual series (moving along the x-axis), compositional shifts also contributed to rising residual 
inequality, particularly after 1988. But these compositional shifts are modest relative to the price effects. 
Next consider the evolution of lower-tail residual inequality during 1973 to 2005. Male 50/10 residual 
inequality rose by 5.7 log points between 1973 and 1989 and then fell by 1.3 log points between 1989 and 
2005 (panel B of Table 4). What are the roles of composition and prices in these shifts? Figure 8 shows that 
both the expansion and compression of lower-tail inequality are largely explained by price changes. In 
particular, during the first half of the sample, the composition-constant growth of residual 50/10 inequality 
was at least 65 percent as large as the unadjusted growth. In the latter half of the sample, price changes were 
also paramount: composition-constant lower tail residual inequality fell by somewhere between 3.5 and 7.1 
log points during 1989 to 2005, with the precise magnitude depending upon the choice of the base year. In 
short, the compression of residual prices during 1989 to 2005 was opposite in sign but comparable in 
magnitude to the expansion of residual prices during 1973 to 1989.  
There is, however, an important difference between the earlier and latter halves of the sample.   21
Consistent with Lemieux (2006b), Figure 8 shows that labor force composition exerted a countervailing, 
upward effect on lower-tail residual inequality after 1989. In particular, the shallow upwards slopes of each 
counterfactual inequality series starting in the mid to late-1980s indicates that, holding prices constant, 
shifts in labor force composition served to increase measured residual inequality. Were it not for the 
countervailing effect of these compositional shifts, the observed decline in residual lower-tail inequality 
would have been even larger. The fact that we find a net decline in (non-composition-adjusted) lower-tail 
residual inequality between 1989 and 2005, however, indicates that the price effects reducing residual 
inequality dominated the composition effects raising it.  
We have so far discussed residual inequality. Notably, our conclusions about the relative importance of 
price and composition effects for the evolution of residual inequality apply with even greater force to 
overall inequality. As shown in Figure 9, the dramatic rises in (overall) upper-tail inequality during both 
halves of the sample are almost completely accounted for by price changes; the contribution of 
compositional shifts is so small as to be almost undetectable. For lower-tail inequality, price and 
compositional changes both play significant, albeit countervailing, roles, with price changes causing lower-
tail compression and compositional shifts leading to lower tail expansion.  
C.  Reconciling with Lemieux (2006b) 
How can our finding that composition plays only a secondary role in explaining the time patterns of 
residual inequality for males in the CPS May/ORG be reconciled with the Lemieux’s (2006b) conclusion 
that the mechanical effects of changes in labor force composition explain the full rise in residual inequality 
after 1988?
26 The answer is seen by studying the net rise in 90/10 residual inequality (thus summing over 
90/50 and 50/10 residual inequality) between 1989 and 2005. Panel C of Table 4 shows that the observed 
rise in 90/10 residual inequality of 2.8 log points over 1989 to 2005 is small relative to the substantial rise in 
upper-tail inequality and compression of lower-tail inequality. Consequently, the relatively modest 
contribution of compositional shifts to residual inequality over this period can be said to explain all—in 
fact, more than all—of the observed rise in 90/10 residual inequality. But this summary conclusion 
aggregates over two, important countervailing forces. The first is the contraction in lower-tail inequality   22
after 1988, which is due to compressing residual ‘prices’ partially offset by changing composition. The 
second is the rise in upper-tail inequality, which appears almost entirely explained by price changes. 
Because composition over-explains the former phenomenon and under-explains the latter, it is accurate to 
say that composition can “fully explain” the aggregate trend in residual inequality after 1988. But when 
upper and lower-tail inequality are considered separately—as seems appropriate given their substantial 
divergence—composition does not appear a satisfying explanation for either.  
 
V.  What explains the polarization of earnings growth? 
 
Following the monotonic surge of inequality from 1979 to 1987, changes in the U.S. wage distribution 
subsequently ‘polarized,’ with a strong, persistent rise in inequality in the upper half of the distribution and 
a slowing then slight reversal of inequality in the lower-half of the distribution. This polarization is seen in 
overall inequality, in residual inequality, and in educational wage differentials. We believe the evidence is 
clear that this polarization is not primarily explained by mechanical effects of labor force composition or by 
episodic, non-market events such as the falling real minimum wage of the 1980s. But canonical supply-
demand models also fail to provide a satisfying explanation for wage polarization since the late 1980s.  
One potentially viable hypothesis focuses on changing demand for job tasks and their link to 
computerization. As argued by Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003 (‘ALM’ hereafter) and amplified by Goos 
and Manning (2003), Spitz-Oener (2006), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) and Dustmann, Ludsteck and 
Schönberg (2007), Skill Biased Technical Change is probably an insufficiently nuanced name for the shifts 
in skill demands that were induced or abetted by the rapid price declines in computer technology over the 
last three decades. In the ALM task framework, computerization has non-monotone impacts on the demand 
for skill throughout the earnings distribution: sharply raising demand for the cognitive and interpersonal 
skills used by educated professionals and managers (‘abstract tasks’); reducing demand for clerical and 
routine analytical and mechanical skills that comprised many middle-educated white collar and 
manufacturing production jobs (‘routine tasks’).
27 Somewhat paradoxically, computerization has probably 
had little direct impact on the demand for the non-routine manual skills (‘manual tasks’) used in many ‘low-  23
skilled’ service jobs such as health aides, security guards, orderlies, cleaners, and servers. Because the 
interpersonal and environmental adaptability demanded by these manual tasks has proven extraordinarily 
difficult to computerize (to date), these manual activities may in fact grow in importance as a share of labor 
input.
28 The ALM framework suggests that computerization (among other forces such as international 
outsourcing) may have raised demand for skill among higher-educated workers, depressed skill demands 
for ‘middle-educated’ workers, and left the lower echelons of the wage distribution comparatively 
unscathed.
29 Goos and Manning (2007) label this process a “polarization of work,” and argue that it may 
have contributed to a hollowing out of the wage distribution in the United Kingdom from 1975 to 2000. 
Spitz-Oener (2005) and Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schönberg (2007) report a similar polarization of 
employment for the former West Germany for 1979 to 1999.
30 
To illustrate the relevance of shifts in task demands for changes in skill demands, we link data on task 
intensity by occupation from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to data on skill level by occupation in 
the 1980 Census. In this analysis, occupational skill level is measured by the mean years of education of an 
occupation’s workforce (weighting workers by their annual hours worked). Figure 10 uses a locally 
weighted smoothing regression to plot task intensity by occupational skill for each of the three broad task 
categories above: abstract, routine and manual tasks.
31 Task intensities are measured as percentiles of the 
baseline distribution of job tasks in 1960. Thus, an occupation with the median intensity of ‘routine’ task 
input in 1960 would receive a score of 50. This figure shows that the intensity of abstract skill input is 
monotonically rising in occupational skill (i.e., education) and, conversely, the intensity of manual task 
input is falling in occupational skill. Most significantly, there is a distinctly non-monotone relationship 
between occupational skill and routine task input. Routine task use is highest between the 20
th and 60
th 
percentiles of the skill distribution, and falls off sharply on either side of this range. This non-monotonic 
relationship is highly relevant because, as documented by ALM, routine task input saw the sharpest decline 
of all task categories over the last two decades (relative to its initial 1960 level). The substitution of 
information technology for routine tasks might be expected to contribute to polarization by reducing 
demand for ‘middle-skill’ occupations relative to either high or low skill occupations.    24
An implication of the polarization hypothesis is that the twisting of the wage structure observed in 
recent years is, in significant part, a demand-side phenomenon, induced by rising relative demands for both 
high and low-skill tasks. This implication is testable, and we provide a simple evaluation here. Following 
Goos and Manning’s (2007) analysis for the U.K., we use U.S. Census data to explore how employment 
growth by occupation over the last two decades is related to occupational skill as proxied by educational 
levels.
32 Our hypothesis is that, if the wage structure changes observed in the 1980s and 1990s are driven in 
substantial part by demand shifts, wages changes by earnings level and employment changes by skill level 
should positively covary in both decades. 
To test this implication, we plot in Figure 11 the change in the share of total hours worked in the 
economy from 1980-1990 and 1990-2000 by occupation skill percentile, using the education-based 
occupational skill measure developed above.
33 For the decade of the 1980s, we see substantial declines in 
employment shares at the bottom end of the skill distribution with strongly monotone increases in 
employment shares as we move up the skill distribution. In contrast, employment growth in the 1990s 
appears to have polarized. There is rapid employment growth the in highest-skill jobs (at or above the 75
th 
percentile), a decline in the employment shares of middle-skill jobs (those at percentiles 30 to 75) and flat 
or rising employment shares in the lowest-skill jobs, those in deciles one through three.  
This pattern of job growth corresponds closely with the observed pattern of wage structure changes in 
each decade, as is shown in the lower panel of Figure 11. Real wage growth was essentially monotone in 
wage percentile in the 1980s, with especially sharp wage growth above the 75
th percentile and especially 
sharp declines below the 30
th percentile. In the decade of the 1990s, however, wage growth was more U-
shaped. Wage growth was stronger below the 30
th percentile and especially above the 80
th percentile of the 
distribution than throughout the remainder of the distribution. Thus, despite substantial differences in the 
evolution of inequality between the 1980s and 1990s, labor market prices and quantities (as measured by 
wage and skill percentiles) appear to positively covary in each decade.  
To provide a slightly more rigorous assessment of this observation, we estimate a set of OLS models of 
the form,   25
(8)  ln pp p EW τ ττ τ τ α βε Δ=+ Δ + , 
where changes in log employment share by skill percentile are regressed on changes in log wages by wage 
percentile in each decade. Here,  p E τ Δ  represents the change in occupational log employment share at skill 
percentile  p  in decade τ  and  ln p W τ Δ  is the change in real log hourly earnings at the corresponding wage 
percentile in the same decade.
34 Using data for the 4
th through 97
th percentiles of the earnings and skill 
distributions (thus trimming outliers at the tails), we estimate that βτ = 3.00 (t=3.75) for the 1980s and that  
βτ = 2.96 (t=1.90) for the 1990s. Thus, both the monotone rise of wage inequality in the 1980s and the 
‘polarized’ growth of wage inequality in the 1990s are mirrored by conformal changes in employment by 
skill. This is consistent with a demand-side explanation for observed wage changes.
35 
We have further experimented with these simple models by including linear terms in wage percentiles 
in addition to (or instead) of estimated wage changes by percentile. For the decade of the 1980s, we find 
that a linear function of wage percentiles fits the observed pattern of skilled employment growth better than 
does the observed change in earnings by percentile. In the 1990s, by contrast, the linear term is insignificant 
and the estimate of  90 00 β −  is hardly affected by its inclusion (either in magnitude or precision). These simple 
models do not, of course, take into account the substitutability and complementary among various skill 
groups (as measured by skill percentiles) and so lack a well-grounded production function interpretation. 
We nevertheless view them as suggestive evidence that labor demand shifts have favored low- and high-
wage workers relative to middle-wage workers over the last fifteen years—a pattern that stands in contrast 
to the shifts in labor demand during the 1980s, which appear to have been monotonically rising in skill. 
 
VI.  Conclusion  
The recent divergence of upper-tail and lower-tail wage inequality and the convexification in the returns 
to education present puzzles for the traditional and revisionist interpretations of changes in the U.S. wage 
structure. Revisionist explanations focusing on non-market factors particularly minimum wages and the 
spurious effects of labor market composition on residual inequality appear unable to provide a compelling   26
explanation for the strong, secular rise in upper-tail inequality over the last least 25 years and the 
polarization of employment growth since 1990. Explanations based on relatively steady trend relative 
demand growth for more skilled workers and fluctuations in relative skill supplies based on canonical 
supply-demand models, such as the two factor CES used by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Autor, Katz and 
Krueger (1998), imply a puzzling slowdown in relative demand growth starting in the early 1990s.  
Despite our rejection of ‘unicausal’ explanations for the complex pattern of wage changes we 
document, the simple analysis above demonstrating that employment and wage growth by skill percentile 
are positively correlated in each of the last two decades leaves us confident that skill demand shifts have 
played a central role in reshaping the wage structure, both during the monotone rise of inequality during the 
1980s and the polarization of wage growth that followed. These trends towards wage structure 
‘polarization’ can we believe be partially reconciled by a reinterpretation of the skill biased technical 
change hypothesis along the lines developed by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), Autor, Katz and Kearney 
(2006), and Goos and Manning (2007).  
Nevertheless, there is more to be understood about the interactions among supply and demand, labor 
market institutions, and macroeconomic conditions than is accommodated by this simple ‘polarization’ 
model. Equally important, the factors contributing to the evolution of U.S. inequality in the decade(s) to 
come may differ significantly from those identified above. International trade and outsourcing factors 
appear likely to become increasingly important, due both to rapid economic development in Asia and 
improvements in computer and communications technology that have dramatically reduced the costs of 
large scale international trade in goods and services. Devising innovative and rigorous means to evaluate 
the impacts of more realistic form of technical change and these evolving globalization forces on inequality 
and economic well-being constitutes a significant agenda item for further research in this field.   27
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VIII.  Data appendix 
 
A.  Basic processing of May/ORG CPS data 
 
We use the May CPS for 1973 to 1978 and the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups for years 1979 to 
2005. All samples include wage/salary workers ages 16 to 64 with 0 to 39 years of potential experience in 
current employment. Earnings weights, equal to the product of CPS sampling weights and hours worked in 
the prior week, are used in all calculations. Hourly wages are the logarithm of reported hourly earnings for 
those paid by the hour and the logarithm of usual weekly earnings divided by hours worked last week (not 
usual weekly hours) for non-hourly workers. We use hours last week instead of usual weekly hours because 
usual weekly hours is not consistently available: starting with the CPS redesign in 1994, workers who report 
that their weekly hours vary are not asked to report usual weekly hours, yielding a non-report rate of 7 to 9 
percent of workers in 1994 to 2005. To check sensitivity, we have tabulated and plotted overall and residual 
inequality measures using imputed usual weekly hours in place of hours last week in all years. This has 
little impact on our results.  
 
Topcoded earnings observations are multiplied by 1.5. Hourly earners of below $1.675/hour in 1982 dollars 
($2.80/hour in 2000$) are dropped, as are hourly wages exceeding 1/35th the topcoded value of weekly 
earnings. All earnings numbers are deflated by the chain-weighted (implicit) price deflator for personal 
consumption expenditures (PCE). Allocated earnings observations are excluded in all years, except where 
allocation flags are unavailable (January 1994 to August 1995). As discussed by Hirsch and Shumacher 
(2004), only about 25 percent of allocated observations in the MORG CPS are actually flagged as allocated 
between 1989 and 1993. Following Lemieux (2006b), we identify and drop non-flagged allocated 
observations by using the unedited earnings values provided in the source data. 
 
B.  Basic processing of March CPS data 
 
We use the March Current Population Survey for sample years 1964 to 2006 (covering earnings years 1963 
to 2005) for workers age 16 to 64 (during the earnings year) with 0 to 39 years of potential experience 
whose class of work in their longest job was private or government wage/salary employment. Most analyses 
are limited to full-time, full-year workers, which we define as those who work 35 hours per week (using the 
Census Bureau’s full-time worker flag) and 40-plus weeks in the prior year. Full-time weekly earnings are 
calculated as the logarithm of annual earnings over weeks worked for the full-time, full-year sample. 
Allocated earnings observations are excluded after (sample year) 1966 using family earnings allocation 
flags (1964 to 1975) or individual earnings allocation flags (1976 forward). Weights are used in all 
calculations. Full-time earnings are weighted by the product of the CPS sampling weight and weeks 
worked. Online reference Tables 1a, 1b and 2 additionally use March CPS hourly earnings for earnings 
years 1975 forward. Hourly earnings are calculated as annual earnings divided by the product of weeks 
worked and usual hours in the prior year and are weighted by the product of the CPS sampling weight, 
weeks worked, and hours worked in the prior year (available starting in earnings year 1975).  
 
Prior to the March 1988 survey, all wage and salary income in the March CPS was reported in a single 
variable, which was topcoded at values between $50,000 and $99,999 in years 1964 to 1987. For these 
cases, we multiply the topcoded earnings value by 1.5, following Katz and Murphy (1992). Commencing in 
1989, wage and salary incomes were collected in two separate earnings variables, corresponding to primary 
and secondary labor earnings. After adjusting for topcoding, we sum these values to calculate total wage 
and salary earnings. Starting in 1988, topcodes are handled as follows. For the primary earnings variable, 
topcoded values are reported at the topcode maximum up to 1995. We multiply these values by 1.5. Starting 
in 1996, topcoded primary earnings values are assigned the mean of all topcoded earners. In these cases, we 
simply reassign the topcoded value and, again, multiply by 1.5. For the secondary earnings value, the 
topcoded maximum is set at 99,999 from 1988 to 1995, falls to 25,000 for 1996 through 2002, and rises to   32
35,000 in 2003 through 2006. For lack of a superior alternative, we again use the topcoded value multiplied 
by 1.5. Earnings numbers are deflated using the PCE deflator. 
 
After making adjustments for topcoding, full-time earnings of below $67/week in 1982$ ($112/week in 
2000$) are dropped.  
 
C.  Processing of  Census Samples 
  
We use the Census IPUMS 5 percent extracts for years 1980, 1990 and 2000 available at www.ipums.org. 
Our sample includes respondents ages 18 through 64 who were currently employed in the civilian labor 
force at the time of the survey, were not in unpaid family work, and who did not live in correctional 
institutions, mental institutions or other non-institutional group quarters. Our labor supply measure is the 
product of weeks worked and usual hours worked in the prior year. For respondents with missing hours, we 
impute labor supply using the mean of workers of the same occupation and education group (high school 
dropout, high school graduate, some college, college graduate). Where the occupation-education cell is 
empty, we assign the mean for the education group. We employ a consistent set of occupation codes for 
Census years 1980, 1990 and 2000 developed by Meyer and Osborne (2005). For wage calculations using 
Census data, we further exclude the self-employed and those with missing hours or weeks worked. Hourly 
wages are calculated as total wage and salary income divided by hours of labor supply. We drop the bottom 
1 percent of hourly earners and multiply hourly wages of top-coded earners by 1.5. We limit the maximum 
hourly wage (via truncation) to the 1.5 times the maximum annual income amount divided by 1,750 (35 
hours per week for 50 hours per year). This correction prevents part-time workers from having a higher 
feasible hourly wage than full-time workers. All calculations are weighted by the product of Census person 
weights and calculated or imputed annual labor supply. Earnings numbers are deflated using the PCE 
deflator. 
 
D.  Coding of education and potential experience in CPS and Census samples 
 
To attain comparable educational categories across the redefinition of Census Bureau’s education variable 
introduced in 1992 in the CPS and the 1990 Census, we use the method proposed by Jaeger (1997). In 
samples coded with the older education question, we defined high school dropouts as those with fewer than 
12 years of completed schooling; high school graduates as those having 12 years of completed schooling; 
some college attendees as those with any schooling beyond 12 years (completed or not) and less than 16 
completed years; and college plus graduates as those with 16 or more years of completed schooling. In 
samples coded with the revised education question, we define high school dropouts as those with fewer than 
12 years of completed schooling; high school graduates as those with either 12 completed years of 
schooling and/or a high school diploma or G.E.D.; some college as those attending some college or holding 
an Associate’s Degree; and college plus as those with a B.A. or higher. 
 
To calculate potential experience in data years coded with the revised education question, we use figures 
from Park (1994) to assign years of completed education to each worker based upon race, gender and 
highest degree held. Years of potential experience were calculated as age minus assigned years of education 
minus 6, rounded down to the nearest integer value.  
 
E.  Construction of relative wage series 
 
We calculate composition-adjusted college-high school relative wages overall and by age or experience 
using the March and May/ORG samples described above. These data are sorted into sex-education-
experience groups based on a breakdown of the data into 2 sexes, 5 education categories (high school 
dropout, high school graduate, some college, college plus, and greater than college), and 4 potential 
experience categories (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, and 30+ years). Log weekly wages of full-time, full-year workers   33
(March CPS) and all hourly workers (May/ORG) are regressed in each year separately by sex on the 
dummy variables for 4 education categories, a quartic in experience, 3 region dummies, black and other 
race dummies, and interactions of the experience quartic with 3 broad education categories (high school 
graduate, some college, and college plus). The (composition-adjusted) mean log wage for each of the 40 
groups in a given year is the predicted log wage from these regressions evaluated for whites, living in the 
mean geographic region, at the relevant experience level (5, 15, 25 or 35 years depending on the experience 
group). Mean log wages for broader groups in each year represent weighted averages of the relevant 
(composition-adjusted) cell means using a fixed set of weights, equal to the mean share of total hours 
worked by each group over 1963 to 2005 from the March CPS.  
 
F.  Construction of relative supply measures 
 
We calculate college/high-school relative supply measures using the March and May/ORG samples above. 
We form a labor ‘quantity sample’ equal to total hours of worked by all employed workers (including those 
in self-employment) with 0 to 39 years of potential experience in 400 gender × education × potential 
experience cells: experience groups are single-year categories of 0 to 39 years; education groups are high 
school dropout, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and post-college. The quantity data 
are merged to a corresponding ‘price sample’ containing real mean full-time weekly (March CPS) or real 
mean hourly (May/ORG CPS) wages by year, gender, potential experience and education. (Wage data used 
for the price sample correspond to the earnings samples described above.) Wages in each of the 400 
earnings cells in each year are normalized to a relative wage measure by dividing each by the wage of high-
school graduate males with 10 years of potential experience in the contemporaneous year.  (The choice of 
the base earnings group is innocuous.) We compute an ‘efficiency unit’ measure for each gender-
experience-education cell as the arithmetic mean of the relative wage measure in that cell over 1963 
through 2005.  
 
The quantity and price samples are combined to calculate relative log college/high-school supplies. Define 
the efficiency units of labor supply of a gender × education × potential experience group in year t as the 
efficiency unit wage measure multiplied by the group’s quantity of labor supply in year t. Following Autor, 
Katz and Krueger (1998) and Card and Lemieux (2001), we calculate aggregate college-equivalent labor 
supply as the total efficiency units of labor supplied by college or college-plus workers plus half of the 
efficiency units of labor supplied by workers with some college. Similarly, aggregate high-school 
equivalent labor supply is the sum of efficiency units supplied by high-school or lower workers, plus half of 
the efficiency units supplied by workers with some college. Our college/high-school log relative supply 
index is the natural logarithm of the ratio of college-equivalent to non-college equivalent labor supply (in 
efficiency units) in each year. This measure is calculated overall for each year and by 10 year potential 
experience groupings.  
 
   34
 
                                                      
1 A narrowing of gender wage differentials is the primary exception to the widening U.S. wage structure 
since 1980. 
2 See Katz and Autor (1999), Goldin and Katz (2001), and Acemoglu (2002) for overviews of this literature. 
See Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) and Machin and Van Reenen (1998) for international comparisons.  
3 DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) also conclude that labor market institutions are the most important 
factor explaining rising wage inequality in the 1980s, but they do not attribute the majority of the increase 
to this factor. 
4 These explanations are not intrinsically at odds, and numerous studies focused on the experience of the 
1980s support the view that institutions and market forces both contributed to rising inequality (Katz and 
Autor 1999). 
5 Approximately eighty percent of the rise in 90-10 earnings inequality from 1980 to 2005 is accounted for 
by the rise in the 90-50 wage gap using hourly wages for all male wage and salary workers in both the CPS 
ORG and March data.  
6 Murphy and Welch (2001) and Lemieux (2006a) also find a "convexification" in the returns to schooling. 
Lemieux concludes that the majority of the rise in wage inequality from 1973 to 2005 is accounted for by 
increased returns to post-secondary schooling. 
7 We also drop from the sample (full-time) workers with weekly earnings below ½ the value of the real 
minimum wage in 1982 ($67 a week in 1982 dollars or $112 a week in 2000 dollars). Starting in 1976 
(earnings year 1975), the March survey began collecting information on hours worked in the prior year, and 
this allows us to create a second March sample of hourly wage data for all wage and salary workers for 
earnings years 1975 to 2005. Supplemental tables using the hourly wage sample for the March CPS are 
available in an online appendix (see online reference Tables 1a, 1b and 2).   35
                                                                                                                                                                              
8 Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) and Lemieux (2006b) find large discrepancies in trends in residual 
inequality in the May/ORG versus March samples beginning in 1994. These series closely parallel each 
other from 1979 to 1994, and then diverge sharply, with the March data showing a continued rise in residual 
inequality from 1994 to 2005 for hourly workers while the ORG data show a flattening. Lemieux attributes 
the bulk of this divergence to a differential rise in measurement error in the March sample. Autor, Katz and 
Kearney call attention to another source of the discrepancy: the redesign of the CPS ORG survey in 1994. 
This redesign changed the format (and increased the complexity) of the earnings component of the survey, 
and was followed by a striking increase in earnings non-response: from 15.3 percent in 1993 (immediately 
prior to the redesign) to 23.3 percent in the last quarter of 1995 (the first quarter in which allocation flags 
are available in the redesigned survey), reaching 31 percent by 2001 (Hirsch and Schumacher 2004). The 
contemporaneous rise in the earnings imputation rate in the March survey was comparatively small. 
9 The top-coding of CPS wage data makes it not very useful for measuring changes in the very top part of 
the distribution. Thus, we symmetrically trim the top and bottom parts of the distribution in Figure 1 and 
focus on wage changes from the 3
rd to 97
th percentile. 
10 The robustness of conclusions concerning the timing of changes in overall and residual wage inequality 
changes to the choice of wage concept and sample are illustrated in an online reference Tables 1a and 1b, 
which presents changes over consistent sub-periods from 1975-2005 of different measures of inequality for 
males, females, and both combined using weekly earnings for full-time workers and hourly wages for all 
workers for the March CPS and May/ORG CPS. 
11 The divergent growth of the 90-50 and 50-10 wage differentials previously has been emphasized by 
Murphy and Welch (2001) and Mishel, Bernstein and Boushey (2002) and is noted by Lemieux (2006b). 
Using decennial Census earnings data, Angrist, Chernozhukov and Fernández-Val (2006) document a sharp 
rise in residual inequality from 1980 to 1990, with a continuing increase from 1990 to 2000 concentrated in 
the upper half of the wage distribution.   36
                                                                                                                                                                              
12 The March and May/ORG samples appear equally valid for measuring between-group wage trends and 
show almost identical patterns in between-group wage differentials since 1973. The March data cover an 
additional decade.  
13 The present analysis of the college wage premium extends earlier work in Katz and Murphy (1992) and 
Katz and Autor (1999), drawing on additional years of data.  
14 We use a standard measure of college/non-college relative supply calculated in “efficiency units” to 
adjust for changes in labor force composition by gender and experience groups. Full details are provided in 
the Data Appendix. 
15 In fact, Goldin and Katz (2007) find that rather steady relative demand growth for college workers 
combined with relative supply growth fluctuations does a nice job of explaining the longer-run evolution of 
the U.S. college wage premium from 1915 to 2005.  Their analysis implies a modest acceleration in demand 
growth after 1950 as well as a slowdown in the trend demand after 1990.  The slowing of relative demand 
growth for college workers after 1990 also has been noted by Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Katz and 
Autor (1999) and Card and DiNardo (2002). 
16 Similar conclusions of a significant slowdown in trend relative demand growth for college workers arise 
in models allowing trends breaks in any year from 1989 to 1994. 
17 For females, earnings growth between 1988 and 2005 among post-college educated workers was 
substantially greater than for college-only workers but the pattern was reversed for 1979 to 1988.  
18 However, the divergence of post-college and college-only wages is inconsistent with this simple two skill 
group CES framework and demands its own explanation, to which we return below. 
19 Skill-biased technological change refers to any introduction of a new technology, change in production 
methods, or change in the organization of work that increases the demand for more-skilled labor relative to 
less-skilled labor at fixed relative wages.   37
                                                                                                                                                                              
20 Foreign outsourcing of less-skilled jobs is another possible explanation for this pattern (Feenstra and 
Hanson 1999). But large within-industry shifts towards more skilled workers are pervasive even in sectors 
with little or no observed foreign outsourcing activity. Foreign outsourcing appears likely to become 
increasingly important, however. 
21 Lemieux (2006b) focuses on the tight fit between the real minimum wage and residual wage variance for 
men and women from 1973 to 2003. We find greater time series explanatory power of the real minimum 
wage for residual wage inequality measures than for actual wage inequality measures. This is puzzling for 
minimum wage hypothesis since the minimum wage should "bite" more for actual low wage workers than 
for residual low wage workers. 
22 Lee (1999) also noted a puzzling relationship between the ‘effective’ state minimum wage (the log 
difference between the state median and the state minimum) and upper-tail inequality. Opposite to the 
simple time-series regressions above, Lee finds in a cross-state analysis that increases in the effective state 
minimum wage appear to reduce upper-tail inequality, both for males and for the pooled-gender 
distribution, leading him to advise caution in causally attributing trends in male and pooled-gender earnings 
inequality to the minimum wage. 
23 In a similar vein, Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) argue that the decline in union penetration in 
the United States and the United Kingdom is partly explained by changing skill demands that reduced the 
viability of rent sharing bargains between high and low skill workers. Furthermore, the direct effects of 
union decline on U.S. wage inequality growth appear to be modest. Card, Lemieux and Riddell (2003) find 
that falling unionization explains about 14 percent of the growth of male wage variance from 1973 to 2001 
(in models allowing for skill group differences in the impact of unions) with an even smaller union effect 
for the growth of female wage variance. 
24 In Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005), we provide a more complete reanalysis of the Lemieux (2006b) using 
a quantile decomposition approach proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) and comparing the findings for   38
                                                                                                                                                                              
the CPS March and May/ORG samples. Here we adopt the kernel reweighting approach of Lemieux to 
facilitate a direct comparison.  
25 In their analysis of the contributions of price and quantities to rising inequality during the 1980s, 
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) perform supply and demand adjustments for observed wages by 
education by experience cells (in addition to applying a kernel reweighting procedure). DFL find these 
supply-demand adjustments to be important, explaining 21 to 33 percent of the growth in male 90/10 log 
hourly earnings inequality between 1979 and 1988. This indicates that the assumption that aggregate skill 
supplies do not affect skill prices is likely to be far from innocuous.  
26 A similar analysis performed using the March CPS samples also supports this conclusion (see online 
reference Table 2).  
27 A related earlier model along these lines is developed in Juhn (1994).  
28 See Levy and Murnane (2004) for numerous paradigmatic examples. The fact that computerization 
causes manual tasks to grow as a share of labor input may be understood as a form of Baumol’s disease.  
29 Welch (2000) and Weinberg (2000) argue that these technical changes are particularly likely to have been 
favorable to demand for female labor. 
30 Acemoglu (1999) offers an alternative theory of job polarization based on endogenous changes in 
production techniques as a response to a rise in the availability of skilled labor.  
31 The task intensity data are constructed by matching Census 1980 data by occupation and gender with task 
measures from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). Task intensities by occupational skill 
percentile are plotted using a locally weighted smoothing regression with bandwidth 0.5 (i.e., one-half of 
one percentile). Details on the processing and matching of DOT task measures to occupations are given in 
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003). The abstract task category we use in Figure 10 is the arithmetic average 
of ALM’s ‘non-routine cognitive/analytic’ and ‘non-routine cognitive/interactive’ category and, similarly,   39
                                                                                                                                                                              
our routine task category is the average of ALM’s ‘routine manual’ and ‘routine cognitive’ categories. Our 
manual category is equivalent to ALM’s ‘non-routine manual’ category.  
32 Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) present a similar analysis using Census data for changes in occupational 
employment and CPS May/ORG data for changes in wage levels by earnings percentile. In the present 
analysis, we use exclusively Census data covering the same time periods.  
33 We employ a consistent set of occupation codes for Census years 1980, 1990 and 2000 developed by 
Meyers and Osborne (2005). We use a locally weighted smoothing regression (bandwidth 0.8 with 100 
observations) to fit the relationship between decadal growth in occupational employment share and 
occupations’ initial skill percentile in the 1980 skill distribution. 
34 In contrast to Figure 11, we use raw changes in employment shares by occupational wage percentile as 
the dependent variable rather than smoothed changes. If we were to instead use smoothed changes, this 
would not affect the point estimates by much but would substantially increase the precision of the estimates.  
35 Notably, this pattern appears inconsistent with the hypothesis that a declining minimum wage played a 
leading role in the expansion of lower-tail inequality in the 1980s. A decline in a binding wage floor should 
have lead to a (modest) rise in low-wage employment rather than a sharp contraction.  1963- 1971- 1979- 1987- 1995- 1963-
1971 1979 1987 1995 2005 2005
All 19.5 0.6 -0.8 -4.8 7.6 22.2
Sex
Men 21.1 0.1 -4.9 -7.8 6.7 15.3
Women 17.3 1.4 4.9 -0.7 9.0 31.8
Education (years of schooling)
0-11 17.0 1.8 -8.4 -10.3 2.5 2.6
12 17.6 3.2 -3.2 -6.6 5.8 16.8
13-15 18.6 0.6 1.2 -5.3 9.5 24.6
16+ 25.4 -4.2 6.8 2.8 12.5 43.3
16-17 22.9 -4.9 5.6 1.0 11.9 36.5
18+ 31.3 -2.6 9.5 6.8 14.0 59.0
Experience (Males)
5  years 20.0 -3.6 -8.5 -7.6 9.0 9.3
25-35 years 21.6 3.4 -1.6 -8.1 3.8 19.2
Education and Experience (Males)
Education 12
Experience 5 19.4 0.7 -16.1 -10.3 7.1 0.7
Experience 25 - 35 17.0 6.3 -2.5 -7.6 0.3 13.6
Education 16+
Experience 5 23.1 -11.0 9.3 -1.9 10.0 29.5
Experience 25 - 35 35.0 1.7 2.6 -2.2 13.8 50.9
Table 1. Changes in Real, Composition-Adjusted Log Weekly wages for Full-
Time, Full-Year Workers, 1963 - 2005. 
(100 x Change in Mean Log Real Weekly Wages)
Tabulated numbers are changes in the (composition-adjusted) mean log wage for each 
group, using data on full-time, full-year workers ages 16 to 64 from the March CPS 
covering earnings in calendar years 1963 to 2005. The data are sorted into sex-
education-experience groups of 2 sexes, 5 education categories (high school dropout, 
high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and post-college), and 4 
potential experience categories (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, and 30-39 years). Log weekly 
wages of full-time, full-year workers are regressed in each year separately by sex on 
dummy variables for 4 education categories, a quartic in experience, 3 region 
dummies, black and other race dummies, and interactions of the experience quartic 
with 3 broad education categories (high school graduate, some college, and college 
plus). The (composition-adjusted) mean log wage for each of the 40 groups in a given 
year is the predicted log wage from these regressions evaluated for whites, living in the 
mean geographic region, at the relevant experience level (5, 15, 25 or 35 years 
depending on the experience group). Mean log wages for broader groups in each year 
represent weighted averages of the relevant (composition-adjusted) cell means using a 
fixed set of weights, equal to the mean share of total hours worked by each group over 
1963 - 2005. All earnings numbers are deflated by the chain-weighted (implicit) price 
deflator for personal consumption expenditures. Earnings of less than $67/week in 
1982$ ($112/week in 2000$) are dropped. Allocated earnings observations are 
excluded in earnings years 1967 forward using either family earnings allocation flags 
(1967 - 1974) or individual earnings allocation flags (1975 earnings year forward). (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1963 - 
1987
-0.636 -0.411 -0.619 -0.599 -0.609 -0.728 -0.403





Time 0.026 0.018 0.026 0.028 0.021 0.028 0.017 0.006
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
Time
2 / 100 -0.011 0.030 0.017
(0.006) (0.015) (0.017)
Time




Constant -0.159 0.043 -0.146 -0.143 -0.124 -0.160 0.266 0.689
(0.119) (0.037) (0.057) (0.108) (0.098) (0.191) (0.112) (0.120)
Observations 25 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.563 0.934 0.953 0.940 0.952 0.955 0.944 0.891
Male prime-age 
unemp. rate
Standard errors in parentheses. Each column presents an OLS regression of the fixed-
weighted college high school wage differential on the indicated variables. The U.S. 
federal minimum wage is deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditure Deflator. 
Source for labor supply and earnings measures is the March CPS, earnings years 
1963-2005.







1963- 20050-9 yrs 10-19 yrs 20-29 yrs 30-39 yrs
-0.282 -0.281 -0.169 -0.325 0.101 0.002
(0.027) (0.027) (0.130) (0.084) (0.084) (0.119)
-0.600 -0.705 -0.855 -0.474 -0.398 -0.544
(0.087) (0.131) (0.262) (0.182) (0.224) (0.239)
-0.074 -0.340 -0.145 0.098 0.028
(0.037) (0.076) (0.049) (0.054) (0.067)
0.004 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Time 0.027 0.031 0.040 0.015 0.016 0.027
(0.004) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Time
2 / 100 -0.009 -0.012 -0.025 0.010 0.000 -0.021
(0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
Constant -0.046 -0.013 0.268 0.359 -0.032 -0.065
(0.079) (0.151) (0.300) (0.223) (0.256) (0.275)
N 172 172 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.863 0.868 0.926 0.969 0.898 0.663
Table 3. Regression Models for the College/High School Log Wage Gap by Potential 
Experience Group, 1963-2005, Males and Females Pooled.
Prime Age Male 
Unemployment
Potential Experience Groups
Standard errors in parentheses. Each column presents an OLS regression of the fixed-
weighted college/high school wage differential on the indicated variables. The 
college/high school wage premium is calculated at the mid-point of each potential 
experience group. Real minimum wage is deflated by the Personal Consumption 
Expenditure Deflator. Columns 1 and 2 also include dummy variables for the 4 potential 
experience groups used in the table.
All Experience Groups
Own Supply Minus 
Aggregate Supply
Aggregate Supply
Log Real Minimum 
WageMales
Observed 4.4 4.0 8.4 10.2 14.2 24.4
1973 X's 4.0 2.8 6.8 11.2 9.2 20.4
1989 X's 3.6 2.6 6.2 8.8 13.5 22.3
2005 X's 2.8 2.9 5.7 7.9 13.0 20.9
Females
Observed 8.2 4.8 12.9 11.3 9.8 21.1
1973 X's 6.8 -0.9 5.9 11.8 9.9 21.7
1989 X's 7.6 1.9 9.5 13.2 10.5 23.7
2005 X's 8.0 4.0 12.0 10.7 10.1 20.8
Males
Observed 5.7 -1.3 4.4 8.1 2.1 10.2
1973 X's 3.9 -7.1 -3.2 8.7 -12.6 -3.9
1989 X's 6.3 -4.0 2.3 5.2 -6.4 -1.2
2005 X's 4.9 -3.5 1.4 15.7 -8.4 7.3
Females
Observed 8.8 0.4 9.2 14.4 2.8 17.3
1973 X's 4.4 -4.5 -0.1 4.9 -8.4 -3.5
1989 X's 5.7 -3.9 1.8 8.5 -7.9 0.6
2005 X's 6.2 -2.5 3.7 8.3 -0.1 8.2
Males
Observed 10.1 2.8 12.8 18.3 16.4 34.6
1973 X's 7.9 -4.3 3.6 19.9 -3.4 16.5
1989 X's 8.0 -1.5 6.5 13.7 7.0 20.7
2005 X's 7.7 -0.7 7.0 23.4 4.6 28.0
Females
Observed 16.9 5.2 22.1 25.7 12.7 38.4
1973 X's 11.2 -5.4 5.8 16.7 1.5 18.2
1989 X's 13.3 -2.0 11.3 21.7 2.6 24.3




Tabulated statistics present observed and composition-constant residual and 
overall wage inequality from May/ORG CPS hourly earnings series for 1973 - 
2005. Residual inequality statistics are obtained from a regression of log 
hourly wages on a full set of age dummies, dummies for nine discreet 
schooling categories, and a full set of interactions among the schooling 
dummies and a quartic in age. All models are estimated separately by 
gender. Compositional adjustments are made using the DiNardo-Fortin-
Lemieux (1996) kernel reweighting approach. See text for further details.
Table 4. 100 x Observed and Composition-Constant Changes in Overall and 
Residual Hourly Inequality Measures (May/ORG CPS 1973, 1989 and 2005)












2005Figure 1. Change in Log Real Weekly Wage by Percentile, Full Time Workers, 
1963 - 2005. 
Source: March CPS data for earnings years 1963-2005, full-time, full-year 
workers ages 16 to 64 with 0 to 39 years of potential experience whose class of 
work in their longest job was private or government wage/salary employment. 
Full-time, full-year workers are those who usually worked 35-plus hours per week 
and worked 40-plus weeks in the previous year. Weekly earnings are calculated 
as the logarithm of annual earnings divided by weeks worked. Calculations are 
weighted by CPS sampling weights and are deflated using the Personal 
Consumption Expenditure (PCE) deflator. Earnings of below $67/week in 1982$ 
($112/week in 2000$) are dropped. Allocated earnings observations are excluded 
in earnings years 1967 forward using either family earnings allocation flags (1967 










































eFigure 2. Three Measures of Wage Inequality: College/High School Premium,  
Male 90/10 Overall Inequality and Male 90/10 Residual Inequality

































































































































College/HS GapFigure 2 note:
Sample for Panel A is full-time, full-year workers from March CPS for earnings years 
1963-2005. Sampe for Panel B is CPS May/ORG all hourly workers for earnings years 
1973-2005. Processing of March CPS data A is detailed in Table 1 and Figure 1 notes. For 
Panel B, samples are drawn from May CPS for 1973 to 1978 and CPS Merged Outgoing 
Rotation Group for years 1979 to 2005. Sample is limited to wage/salary workers ages 
16 to 64 with 0 to 39 years of potential experience in current employment. Calculations 
are weighted by CPS sample weight times hours worked in the prior week. Hourly wages 
are equal to the logarithm of reported hourly earnings for those paid by the hour and the 
logarithm of usual weekly earnings divided by hours worked last week for non-hourly 
workers. Topcoded earnings observations are multiplied by 1.5. Hourly earners of below 
$1.675/hour in 1982 dollars ($2.80/hour in 2000$) are dropped, as are hourly wages 
exceeding 1/35th the topcoded value of weekly earnings. All earnings are deflated by the 
chain-weighted (implicit) price deflator for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). 
Allocated earnings observations are excluded in all years, except where allocation flags 
are unavailable (January 1994 to August 1995). Where possible, we identify and drop 
non-flagged allocated observations by using the unedited earnings values provided in the 
source data.
The college/high school wage premium series depicts a fix-weighted ratio of college to 
high-school wages for a composition-constant set of sex-education-experience groups (2 
sexes, 5 education categories, and 4 potential experience categories). See Table 1 notes 
and Data Appendix for further details. 
The overall 90/10 inequality series depicts the difference between the 90th and 10th 
percentile of log weekly (March) or log hourly (May/ORG) male earnings. The residual 
90/10 series depicts the 90-10 difference in wage residuals from a regression of the log 
wage measure on a full set of age dummies, dummies for nine discreet schooling 
categories, and a full set of interactions among the schooling dummies and a quartic in 
age. Figure 3. 90/50 and 50/10 Full-Time Weekly and Hourly Wage Inequality in March (Full-Time) and May/ORG (Hourly) 
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Overall Female 50/10  Wage InequalityFigure 4. College/High School Relative Supply and Wage Differential, 
1963 - 2005 (March CPS) — Panel A. Detrended Measures of Supply and Wage 
Differentials — Panel B. Katz-Murphy Model for College/HS Wage Differential: 
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Detrended Wage Differential Detrended Relative Supply




























1963 1969 1975 1981 1987 1993 1999 2005
Observed CLG/HS Gap Katz-Murphy Predicted Wage Gap: 1963-1987 Trend
B. Katz-Murphy Prediction Model for the College-High School Wage GapFigure 4 note: 
Composition-adjusted college-high school relative wages are calculated using March FT/FY earners 
data, sorted into sex-education-experience groups of 2 sexes, 5 education categories and 4 potential 
experience categories. Mean log wages for broader groups in each year represent weighted 
averages of the relevant (composition-adjusted) cell means using a fixed set of weights that are equal 
to the mean share of total hours worked by each group over 1963 to 2005 from the March CPS. See 
Table 1 notes for additional details.
The college/high-school log relative supply index is the natural logarithm of the ratio of college-
equivalent to non-college equivalent labor supply in efficiency units in each year. See the Data 
Appendix for details.
The detrended supply and wage series in panel A are the residuals from seperate OLS regressions of 
the relative supply and relative wage measures on a constant and a linear time trend. The Katz-
Murphy predicted wage gap series in panel B is the fitted values from an OLS regression of the 
college/high school wage gap for years 1963 through 1987 on a constant and the college/high school 
relative supply measure. Plotted 1988 to 2005 values are out-of-sample predictions.Figure 5. Trends in Composition-Adjusted Real Log Weekly Full-Time Wages by 
Gender and Education, 1963 - 2005 (March CPS).
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) B. FemalesFigure 6. Composition Adjusted Log Relative College/High Wage and Supply 
by Potential Experience and Age Groups, 1963 - 2003 (March CPS).
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1963 1969 1975 1981 1987 1993 1999 2005
Experience 0-9 Experience 20-29
B. College-High School Relative Supply by Potential Experience GroupFigure 7. Log Real Federal Minimum Wage and Log 90/10, 90/50 and 50/10 Hourly Wage Differentials, 1973-2005 (May/ORG CPS). 
Note: Nominal minimum wages are deflated to real log values using the PCE deflator. In the first panel, the real log minimum wage measure is normalized to zero 
in 1973. Subsequent panels depict the observed wage gap (90/10, 90/50, and 50/10) for all hourly workers from the May/ORG CPS samples in each year plotted 
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1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005
90-10 Wage Gap E(90-10 Gap | Min Wage)
90/10 Gap = 2.60 (0.14) - 0.74 (0.09) x MinWage, R-Squared=0.71
























1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005
50-10 Wage Gap E(50-10 Gap | Min Wage)
50/10 Gap = 1.09 (0.07) - 0.26 (0.04) x MinWage, R-Squared=0.58


























1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005
90-50 Wage Gap E(90-50 Gap | Min Wage)
90/50 Gap = 1.51 (0.14) - 0.48 (0.08) x MinWage, R-Squared=0.52
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Female 50/10Figure 8 note:
Data source: CPS May/ORG samples for all hourly workers are detailed in notes to 
Figure 2. Series labeled "observed residual" presents the 90-50 or 50-10 difference in 
wage residuals from an OLS regression (weighted by CPS sampling weight times hours 
worked in the prior week) of log hourly earnings on a full set of age dummies, dummies 
for nine discreet schooling categories, and a full set of interactions among the schooling 
dummies and a quartic in age. All models are estimated separately by gender.
Series labeled "YEAR f(e | skills)" present 90-50 or 50-10 difference in wage residuals 
for a reweighted residual wage distribution from year "YEAR," where weights are 
proportional to ratio of the density of skills (defined by age, schooling and their 
interactions) in the year depicted on the x-axis to the corresponding density of skills in 
year "YEAR." Thus, the series labeled "1973 f(e|skills)" plots the 90-50 or 50-10 
difference in wage residuals using the 1973 density of wage residuals reweighted using 
the skills distributions of years 1973 through 2005. See text for additional details of 
reweighting procedure. Figure 9. Actual and Counterfactual 90/50 and 50/10 Overall Hourly Wage Inequality 1973-2005 (CPS May/ORG). 
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Year of Skill Distribution
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Year of Skill Distribution
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Year of Skill Distribution
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Year of Skill Distribution
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Female 50/10Figure 10. Task Intensity by Occupational Skill Percentile, Defined as 
Occupational Rank (in Percentiles) in Mean Years of Schooling.
Note: Task intensity by occupational percentile is plotted using a locally 
weighted smoothing regression with bandwidth 0.5 (i.e., one-half of one 
percentile). Occupational skill is measured as the employment-weighted 
percentile rank of an occupation's mean years of education in the Census 
IPUMS 1980 5-percent extract. Mean education in each occupation is calculated 
using workers' hours of annual labor supply times the Census sampling weight. 
Data on task intensity by occupation is from the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles and compiled by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003). Task intensities are 
measured as percentiles of the baseline distribution of job tasks in 1960. Thus, 
an occupation with the median intensity of routine task input in 1960 would 
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Task Input by Occupational Skill Percentile 1980
Skill PercentileFigure 11. 
(A) Change in Occupation's Employment Shares 1980-1990 and 1990-2000 
by Occupational Skill Percentile in 1980.
(B) Changes in Real Hourly Earnings by Wage Percentile, 1980-1990 and 
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Change in Real Hourly Earnings by Wage Percentile 1980-1990 and 1990-2000Figure 11 note:
Data source: Census IPUMS 5 percent extracts for years 1980, 1990 and 2000. Samples 
includes respondents ages 18 through 64 who were currently employed in the civilian 
labor force at the time of the survey, were not in unpaid family work, and who did not 
live in correctional institutions, mental institutions or other non-institutional group 
quarters. The labor supply measure is the equal to the Census sample weight times the 
product of weeks worked and usual weekly hours in the prior year. For respondents with 
missing hours, we impute labor supply using the mean of workers of the same 
occupation and education group (high school dropout, high school graduate, some 
college, college graduate). Where the occupation-education cell is empty, we assign the 
mean for the education group. 
Panel A plots log changes in employment shares by 1980 occupational skill percentile 
rank using a locally weighted smoothing regression (bandwidth 0.8 with 100 
observations), where skill percentiles are as defined in the notes to Figure 10. Consistent 
occupation codes for Census years 1980, 1990 and 2000 are from Meyer and Osborne 
(2005). 
Panel B plots decadal changes in real log wages by wage percentile. Wage calculations 
exclude the self-employed and those with missing hours or weeks worked. Hourly wages 
are calculated as total wage and salary income divided by hours of labor supply. The 
bottom 1 percent of hourly earners are dropped. Hourly wages of top-coded earners are 
multiplied by 1.5. We limit the maximum hourly wage (via truncation) to the 1.5 times 
the maximum annual income amount divided by 1,750 (35 hours per week for 50 hours 
per year). All wage calculations are weighted by the product of Census person weights 
and calculated or imputed annual labor supply. Earnings are deflated using the PCE 
deflator.